

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 09592 01 OF 02 201734Z

41

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00

CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04

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SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00 OMB-01 DRC-01 /149 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 647

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 9592

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: PRESENTATION OF OUTLINE OF
PROPOSALS

FROM US REP MBFR

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESENTATION OF OUTLINE OF
PROPOSALS, AS TENTATIVELY AGREED IN AD HOC GROUP NOVEM-
BER 19. WORDING OF SUBSTANTIVE PORTIONS OF TEXT
WILL OF COURSE BE ADJUSTED, IF NECESSARY IN LIGHT
OF COUNCIL DECISION ON OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS.
AD HOC GROUP AGREED THAT WORDING OF SECOND SENTENCE
OF PARAGRAPH 14 (FLANK POINT) WILL BE IDENTICAL TO
CORRESPONDING PASSAGE IN OUTLINE PROPOSAL. AD HOC
GROUP ALSO AGREED TO CONSIDER FURTHER THE ADVISABILITY
OF INCLUDING A SENTENCE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (NOW BRACKETED
IN PARA 14).
BEGIN TEXT:

PRESENTATION OF OUTLINE PROPOSALS BY THE US REPRESENTATIVE

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PAGE 02 VIENNA 09592 01 OF 02 201734Z

1. BEGINNING WITH THE OPENING SESSIONS OF THESE

NEGOTIATIONS AND MORE PARTICULARLY IN THE SESSIONS OF NOVEMBER 13 AND 15, MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE PRESENTED OUR GENERAL PROPOSALS FOR THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE DISCUSSED THE NATURE OF THE SECURITY PROBLEM IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THEN EXPLORED THE SOLUTIONS WE PROPOSE TO VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THIS PROBLEM.

2. TODAY, ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, I WISH TO TIE TOGETHER THE STRANDS OF OUR PREVIOUS PRESENTATIONS AND PRESENT OUR OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS. WE BELIEVE THESE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WILL CONTRIBUTE IN A SIGNIFICANT WAY TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. THEY ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ALL CONCERNED. AND THEY RESPOND TO THE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE EXISTING SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

3. THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF OUR PROPOSALS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

4. THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD COMPRISE THE TERRITORIES OF BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS AND POLAND. WE CONTINUE TO RESERVE OUR RIGHT TO RAISE AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME IN THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS THE QUESTION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HUNGARY WILL BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS OR MEASURES.

5. REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MADE IN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. GROUND FORCES ARE THE LARGEST AND MOST SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ELEMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEY ARE OF DECISIVE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPORTANCE. WITHOUT THEM, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, TERRITORIES CAN NEITHER BE SEIZED NOR HELD, NEITHER INVADDED NOR DEFENDED. IT IS ONLY BY ADDRESSING GROUND FORCES THAT WE CAN DEAL WITH THE MAJOR DISPARITIES MAKING FOR INSTABILITIES IN THE EXISTING SITUATION. THUS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONCENTRATE ON GROUND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 09592 01 OF 02 201734Z

FORCES IF WE ARE TO ACCOMPLISH THE AGREED OBJECTIVES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

6. THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITY. EACH SIDE SHOULD

REDUCE ITS ACTIVE DUTY GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS TO THE SAME AGREED LOWER LEVEL OF MANPOWER. THIS IS WHAT WE MEAN BY A COMMON CEILING. A COMMON CEILING WOULD CONTRIBUTE IMPORTANTLY TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BY ELIMINATING THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. TAKING APPROPRIATE ACCOUNT OF COMBAT CAPABILITY SHOULD INCLUDE ADDRESSING THE DISPARITY IN TANKS--ONE OF THE MAIN FACTORS MAKING FOR INSTABILITY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND A SOURCE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO US.

7. THE COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES. THIS CEILING MIGHT BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 700,000 SOLDIERS ON EACH SIDE. THIS WOULD REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION BELOW PRESENT MANPOWER LEVELS. HOWEVER, NEITHER SIDE NEED FEAR THAT ITS SECURITY WOULD BE DIMINISHED. AT A LEVEL OF ABOUT 700,000 GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL ON EACH SIDE, THE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF BOTH SIDES WOULD REMAIN SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE FIRM ASSURANCE OF THE ABILITY TO DEFEND AGAINST AN ATTACK. MOREOVER, IN A NEW AND IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP OF NUMERICAL EQUALITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, STABILITY WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCED AND THIS WOULD BE A FAIR AND EQUITABLE RESULT.

8. REDUCTIONS TO THE AGREED COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN TWO SUCCESSIVE PHASES, GOVERNED BY SEPARATE AGREEMENTS. THIS WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE WAY TO PROCEED. IT WOULD BUILD INCREASED MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WHILE PRESERVING UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. REDUCTIONS WOULD IN EACH PHASE BE SUBSTANTIAL AND SIGNIFICANT, YET NOT SO LARGE AS TO BE UNMANAGEABLE OR INCALCULABLE IN THEIR EFFECTS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 09592 01 OF 02 201734Z

9. THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND US GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA. THIS ACTION WOULD BE IN KEEPING WITH THE PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE US AND SOVIET UNION FOR PRESERVING PEACE IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD. US AND SOVIET FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE THE LARGEST AND MOST SIGNIFICANT FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA. REDUCTION OF THE FORCES BELONGING TO THE TWO MAJOR POWERS WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. FURTHERMORE, IT WOULD BE A PRACTICAL WAY TO PROCEED AND, IN NEGOTIATIONS AS COMPLEX AS THESE, THE SIMPLEST.

10. IT IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE THAT REDUCTIONS BE SUCH AS TO CONTRIBUTE MEANINGFULLY TO AN

IMPROVEMENT IN THE EXISTING SITU

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 09592 02 OF 02 201743Z

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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 9592

FROM US REP MBFR

MEANINGFUL STEP TOWARD A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP IN THE AREA,
AND A SIGNIFICANT FIRST STEP TOWARD A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND
FORCE MANPOWER, YET NOT SO LARGE A STEP AS TO RISK BEING
DESTABILIZING.

13. AS REGARDS GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES, THESE AMERICAN FORCES
WOULD BE WITHDRAWN A MUCH GREATER DISTANCE FROM THE REDUCTION
AREA THAN WOULD THE SOVIET FORCES. THE EASTERN COAST OF THE
UNITED STATES IS MORE THAN 5,000 KILOMETERS FROM THE DIVIDING
LINE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHEREAS THE WESTERN BORDER OF THE
USSR IS ONLY 650 KILOMETES OVERLAND FROM THIS LINE. THE RATIO
OF THESE DISTANCES IS 8 TO 1, TO THE US DISADVANTAGE.
THUS, SHOULD IT EVER BECOME NECESSARY, IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT,
BY FAR, TO RETURN THE AMERICAN FORCES -- ONCE WITHDRAWN --
TO THE AREA, THAN IT WOULD BE TO RETURN TO SOVIET SOLDIERS. THE
LATTER COULD BE RETURNED OVERLAND FROM THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH
ADJOINS THE REDUCTION AREA? THEIR RETURN WOULD BE RELATIVELY
EASY. US SOLDIERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD BE WITHDRAWN ACROSS
AN OCEAN TO ANOTHER CONTINENT. THUS US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS
CANNOT BE DETERMINED THROUGH ANY MECHANICAL FORMULA. THE GEOGRAPHIC

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PAGE 02 VIENNA 09592 02 OF 02 201743Z

IS SO GREAT THAT EQUITY AND THE CRITERION OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY REQUIRE THAT IT BE TAKEN INTO FULL ACCOUNT. CONSEQUENTLY, IN ORDER TO HELP OFFSET THIS GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY, US SOLDIERS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS, AND THEIR EQUIPMENT COULD BE STORED AND MAINTAINED IN THE AGREED AREA, AS THE US GOVERNMENT MAY DECIDE IN BOTH CASES. THIS APPROACH WOULD BE EQUITABLE; IT WOULD CONFER NO ADVANTAGES ON THE US, GIVEN THE SOVIET UNION'S GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY TO THE REDUCTION AREA.

14. I SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FURTHER POINT. IN WITHDRAWING FORCES FROM THE AREA, IT SHOULD BE INSURED THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT SHOULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT IN A MANNER SUCH AS TO DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE FLANK COUNTRIES. (BRACKETS) I SHOULD LIKE TO ADD, ON BEHALF OF THOSE OF MY COLLEAGUES WHO REPRESENT COUNTRIES BELONGING TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THAT OUR PROPOSALS WOULD IN THEIR VIEW BE CONSISTENT WITH THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. (END BRACKETS)

15. IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT ASSOCIATED MEASURES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH MEASURES, WHICH WOULD FORM AN INTEGRAL PART OF A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT, WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH SIDES. THEY WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY AND INCREASE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE THROUGH REDUCING FEAR OF SURPRISE ATTACK AND REDUCING THE RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION, FOR EXAMPLE THOSE ARISING OUT OF AMBIGUOUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS OUTCOME IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE IT WOULD BOTH FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS AND MAKE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS THEMSELVES MORE EFFECTIVE. MOREOVER, THEY WOULD CONTRIBUTE IN A DIRECT AND IMPORTANT WAY TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP -- ONE OF THE AGREED OBJECTIVES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. APPROPRIATE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS SHOULD THEREFORE BE ADOPTED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS.

16. BOTH SIDES HAVE A MUTUAL INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE CARRIED OUT AND FAITHFULLY MAINTAINED. ONLY WITH SUCH ASSURANCE CAN MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BE ENHANCED AND SUSTAINED. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD THEREFORE, INCLUDE VERIFICATION MEASURES DESIGNED TO DO THIS, AND TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. AT AN APPROPRIATE LATER STAGE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS,

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 09592 02 OF 02 201743Z

WE WILL BE MAKING MORE DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR MEASURES FOR VERIFICATION.

17. SIMILARLY, BOTH SIDES HAVE A MUTUAL INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT REDUCTION AGREEMENTS, ONCE REACHED, ARE NEITHER CIRCUMVENTED NOR UNDERMINED. A REDUCTION AGREEMENT SHOULD THEREFORE INCLUDE APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS TO ENSURE NON- CIRCUMVENTION OF THE AGREEMENT. WE WILL ADVANCE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON THIS TOPIC AT A LATER

POINT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

18. THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND PHASE IN WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD FURTHER REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD PROVIDE FOR COMPLETION OF THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE AGREED COMMON CEILING.

19. AGREEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS WE HAVE ADVANCED TODAY WOULD REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL AND SIGNIFICANT FORWARD STEP IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IT WOULD BE A REALISTIC AND PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO DIFFICULT AND IMPORTANT SECURITY PROBLEMS WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS MUST ADDRESS. IT WOULD BE EQUITABLE; IT WOULD PRESERVE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL CONCERNED. MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT WOULD BE THE BASIS OF A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IT WOULD STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. IT WOULD FULFILL THE AGREED OBJECTIVES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND REPRESENT A MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF WHICH WE COULD JUSTLY BE PROUD.

20. MR. CHAIRMAN, I WILL NOW TABLE THE OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS PRESENTED BY BELGIUM, CANADA, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES. THESE PROPOSALS ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING WITH A SPECIAL STATUS: DENMARK, GREECE, ITALY, NORWAY AND TURKEY. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS, IN A CONCISE FORM, THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESENTATION I HAVE JUST MADE TO YOU. WE LOOK FORWARD TO MUTUAL DISCUSSION OF THE DETAILS OF OUR PROPOSAL IN THE COMING PERIOD WITH A VIEW TO AGREEMENT. WE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 09592 02 OF 02 201743Z

HAVE NOTED YOUR PROPOSALS, AND ARE GIVING THEM CAREFUL STUDY. WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. END TEXT. HUMES

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